Cruz-Martinez v Cupidon

• Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands
• Judge: (Zacca, P., Kerr and Collett, JJ.A.)
• Judgment Date: 15 April 1999
• Court: Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
• Date: 15 April 1999

Court of Appeal

(Zacca, P., Kerr and Collett, JJ.A.)

CRUZ-MARTINEZ

and

CUPIDON (as Administratrix of the Estate of KNIGHT, deceased)

BOXWELL and PARROTS LANDING WATER SPORTS PARK LIMITED

and

STURDIVANT and MELLON BANK N.A.

R.D. Alberga, Q.C. and H.D. Murray for Cruz-Martinez;

A.J. Jones and R.J. Grierson for Cupidon;

J.R. McDonough for Boxwell;

D.MacF. Murray for Parrots Landing Water Sports Park Ltd.;

J.C.B. Chapman for Sturdivant and Mellon Bank N.A.

Legislation construed:

Estates Proceedings Law, 1974 (Law 3 of 1974), s.5: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 179, line 42 – page 180, line 3.

Law of Torts Reform Law (Revised), s.4(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 179, lines 39–40.

Limitation Law, 1991 (Law 12 of 1991), s.13(4): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 180, lines 16–17.

s.13(5): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 180, lines 19–26.

s.16(2): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 180, lines 33–40.

(3): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 182, lines 6–8.

s.44(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 181, lines 40–42.

Limitation Act 1980 (c.58), s.39:

‘This Act shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act)….’

Limitation of Actions-tort actions-fatal accidents-under Limitation Law (1996 Revision), ss. 13(5) and 16(2), actions (a) on behalf of estate under Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision) and (b) for loss of dependency under Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision) to be brought within three years from death

Statutes-repeal-implied repeal-provisions of later statute repeal earlier inconsistent legislation-limitation periods in Estates Proceedings Law, s.5 and Law of Torts Reform Law, s.4(1) impliedly replaced by Limitation Law, 1991, ss. 13(5) and 16(2)-preservation under s.44(1) of limitation periods prescribed by ‘any other Law’ applies only to Laws not specifically mentioned in 1991 Law

The respondents brought proceedings in tort in the Grand Court to recover damages on behalf of deceased persons” estates and in respect of their own loss of dependency resulting from the deaths.

The respondents commenced proceedings outside the one-year limitation periods prescribed for the respective actions by the Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision), s.5 and the Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision), s.4(1). In response to the appellants” applications for the striking out of the proceedings, the Grand Court (Graham, J.) held that the limitation periods prescribed by the original Estates Proceedings Law, 1974 and the Law of Torts Reform Law (Revised) of 1977 (and retained in their respective revisions) had been impliedly repealed by the Limitation Law, 1991 and replaced by the three-year periods prescribed by ss. 13(5) and 16(2) of that Law. This was on the basis that later legislation must be taken to repeal earlier inconsistent legislation unless such a construction was impossible on the plain words of the statute. The court also had regard to the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons preceding the Bill on which the 1991 Law was based and to marginal notes in the Law. The proceedings in the Grand Court in Cupidon v. Cruz-Martinez are reported at 1998 CILR 216.

On appeal, the appellants submitted that the Grand Court had wrongly

dismissed their applications to strike out the respondents” claims since (a) by virtue of s.44(1) of the Limitation Law, 1991 the longer limitation periods contained in ss. 13(5) and 16(2) applied only where no other period was prescribed by another Law, and s.16(3) made the application of sub-s. (2) subject to s.44(1); and (b) notwithstanding that the legislature might have erred in its method of adopting the statutory limitation periods now in force in England, the court was obliged to construe Cayman legislation according to its plain meaning.

The respondents submitted in reply that (a) s.44(1) of the Limitation Law, 1991 referred only to limitation periods in other statutes which had not been impliedly repealed by that Law as a whole; and (b) the confused pattern of legislation had resulted from the adoption of one-year limitation periods from English statutes dealing with fatal accidents and the survival of actions, in ignorance of the fact that English legislation had specifically repealed those provisions, followed by the enactment of the Limitation Law, 1991 which included references to the new three-year periods not previously enacted here.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

The Grand Court had properly dismissed the appellants” applications to strike out the respondents” claims. The contradiction between the provisions of the Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision), s.4(1) and the Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision), s.5 on the one hand, and ss. 13(5) and 16(2) of the Limitation Law (1996 Revision) on the other, was readily explained by an...