Cupidon v Cruz-Martinez

JurisdictionCayman Islands
Judge(Graham, J.)
Judgment Date06 August 1998
CourtGrand Court (Cayman Islands)
Date06 August 1998
Grand Court

(Graham, J.)

CUPIDON (as Executrix of the Estate of KNIGHT, deceased)
and
CRUZ-MARTINEZ

A.J. Jones and R.J. Grierson for the plaintiff;

R.D. Alberga, Q.C. and D.M. Murray for the defendant.

Cases cited:

(1) -British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Stewart, [1913] A.C. 186; (1913), 83 L.J.(P.C.) 53, applied.

(2) -Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [1934] 1 K.B. 590; (1934), L.J.(K.B.) 364, applied.

(3) -Finnegan v. Cementation Co. Ltd., [1953] 1 Q.B. 688; [1953] 1 All E.R. 1130, dictum of Singleton, L.J. applied.

(4) -Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593; [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, followed.

(5) -Vauxhall Estates v. Liverpool Corp., [1932] 1 K.B. 733; (1931), 146 L.T. 167, applied.

Legislation construed:

Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision) (Law 3 of 1974, revised 1995), s.2:

‘Subject as herein, on the death of any person all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him immediately before his death shall survive against or, as the case may be, for the benefit of his estate.’

s.5: ‘No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of a cause of action in tort under section 2 unless-

(a) proceedings were pending at the date of the death; or

(b) the cause of action arose not earlier than one year before death and suit is filed in court in respect thereof not later than one year after the representative or representatives took out representation.’

Limitation Law (1996 Revision) (Law 12 of 1991, revised 1996), s.13: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 220, lines 16–35.

s.16(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 222, lines 1–8.

(2): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 222, lines 17–24.

s.44: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 221, lines 5–15.

Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision), s.4:

‘Provided that not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint and that every such action shall be commenced within one year of the death of such deceased person.’

Limitation of Actions-tort actions-fatal accidents-under Limitation Law (1996 Revision), ss. 13(5) and 16(2), actions (a) on behalf of estate under Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision) and (b) for loss of dependency under Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision) to be brought within three years from death

Statutes-repeal-implied repeal-provisions of later statute repeal earlier inconsistent legislation unless plain wording to contrary-limitation periods in Estates Proceedings Law, s.5 and Law of Torts Reform Law, s.4 impliedly replaced by Limitation Law, 1991, ss. 13(5) and 16(2)

The plaintiff brought proceedings to recover damages on behalf of the deceased”s estate in respect of personal injuries resulting from a road accident caused by the defendant”s negligence, and for herself in respect of loss of dependency resulting from the deceased”s suicide two years later.

The plaintiff obtained letters of administration of the deceased”s estate and issued a writ claiming damages two years after the deceased committed suicide, allegedly because of the psychological effects of his injuries.

The defendant submitted that (a) the claim on behalf of the estate under s.2 of the Estates Proceedings Law was time barred under s.5 since (i) no action had been pending on behalf of the deceased at the time of his death; and (ii) more than one year had elapsed between the cause of action and the deceased”s death; (b) the claim under the Torts (Reform) Law was time barred under the proviso to s.4, which specified that claims should be brought within one year of death; (c) by virtue of s.44(1) of the Limitation Law (1996 Revision) the greater limitation period contained in s.13(5) in respect of claims on behalf of the estate applied only where no other period was prescribed by another Law; and (d) s.16(1) of the Limitation Law specifically prohibited the bringing of an action under the Torts (Reform) Law where such an action was time barred under another statute.

The plaintiff submitted in reply that (a) the limitation periods pre-scribed by the original Estates Proceedings Law and the Law of Torts Reform Law had been impliedly repealed by the Limitation Law, 1991 and replaced by the three-year periods prescribed by ss. 13(5) and 16(2); and (b) the provisions of ss. 16(1) and 44(1) referred only to limitation

periods in other statutes which had not been impliedly repealed by the Limitation Law as a whole.

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) The plaintiff”s claims would not be struck out since the writ had been issued within three years of the deceased”s death, in accordance with ss. 13(5) and 16(2) of the Limitation Law (1996 Revision). The Limitation Law 1991 had replaced the one-year limitation periods in the Estates Proceedings, Law of 1974 and the Law of Torts Reform Law of 1977 by necessary implication, since later legislation must be taken to repeal earlier inconsistent legislation unless such a construction was impossible on the plain words of the statute. Section 13 of the Limitation Law clearly contemplated both claims on behalf of the estate and for loss of dependency-since they arose from the defendant”s negligence and consisted of damages for personal injuries to the deceased-and s.16 specifically imposed a three-year limitation period for claims under the Torts (Reform) Law. Furthermore, reference to the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons preceding the Bill on which the 1991 Law had been based and to marginal notes in the Law confirmed that these sections were to apply to personal injuries and fatal accident claims respectively (page 220, line 44 – page 221, line 3; page 221, lines 18–40; page 222, lines 10–26; page 222, line 37 – page 223, line 6).

(2) Nevertheless, it appeared that the different pieces of legislation had been drafted without adequate consideration for resulting inconsistencies, and therefore, if the Court of Appeal were to take a different view as to their construction, it would be better for the legislature to address the problem (page 222, lines 43–45; page 223, lines 15–17).

25 GRAHAM, J.: The chronology of this tragic matter is as
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1 cases
  • Cruz-Martinez v Cupidon
    • Cayman Islands
    • Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
    • 15 April 1999
    ...the 1991 Law was based and to marginal notes in the Law. The proceedings in the Grand Court in Cupidon v. Cruz-Martinez are reported at 1998 CILR 216. On appeal, the appellants submitted that the Grand Court had wrongly dismissed their applications to strike out the respondents” claims sinc......

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