Andrade v Frederick
| Jurisdiction | Cayman Islands |
| Judge | Ramsay-Hale, J. |
| Judgment Date | 02 February 2021 |
| Court | Grand Court (Cayman Islands) |
(Ramsay-Hale, J.)
GRAND CT.
Statutes — repeal — implied repeal — time limit provision in Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (2012 Revision), s.17 not impliedly repealed by Limitation Act (1996 Revision), s.13
Held, striking out the plaintiff's claim:
(1) The plaintiff's claim had no prospect of success and was frivolous and vexatious as being statute barred. It would be struck out and judgment entered for the defendant. Section 17 of the Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act provided the defendant with an indefeasible defence to the plaintiff's claim. Section 17, which provided a non-extendable limitation period of three years, had not been repealed by implication. The Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Law 1990 (now the Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act) and the Limitation Act 1991 had been brought into force within three months of each other. Although the Acts made different provisions for barring actions for personal injury, they could stand together and had done so since 1991. The mere fact that s.17 did not allow the exceptions and extensions to the limitation period that were allowed by s.13, which applied where personal injury arose from other torts, was not absurd. Section 17 was a specific provision and s.13 a general one, so there was a strong presumption against implied repeal which, in this case, was not displaced. Section 13 did not cover damage to property, so the sections did not in fact cover the same ground. The Limitation Act, by s.44(1), expressly saved s.17 which prescribed a different period of limitation for actions for personal injury and damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle which was required to be insured. The decision in Bennett v. Diaz was given per incuriam (paras. 111–115).
(2) The court was not bound by the decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Convention dictated that a judge should follow the decisions of a judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction as a matter of comity and to promote consistency in judicial decisions. If a decision was of long-standing, it should be followed by another judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction, at least in a case involving the construction of a statute of some complexity, unless the judge was fully satisfied that the previous decision was wrong. Bennett v. Diaz was a recent decision, it had not been appealed or (so far as the court was aware) followed, it was itself a departure from the decisions of two co-ordinate courts as to the effect of s.17 and no decision was binding if rendered per incuriam because a statutory provision was not brought to the court's attention and the decision was as a consequence given in ignorance of that provision (paras. 14–16).
(1) Bennett v. Diaz, 2020 (1) CILR 382, not followed.
(2) Cole v. N.E.M. (West Indies) Ins. Ltd., 2009 CILR 367, considered.
(3) Cruz-Martinez v. Cupidon, 1999 CILR 177, considered.
(4) Grant v. Mclaughlin, [2019] JMCA Civ 4, considered.
(5) H v. Lord Advocate, [2012] UKSC 24, considered.
(6) Maunsell v. Olins, [1975] A.C. 373; [1975] 1 All E.R. 16, considered.
(7) Melbourne v. Wan(1985), 22 JLR 131, considered.
(8) Ming v. R., 2009 CILR N [28], considered.
(9) O'Byrne v. Environment Secy., [2001] EWCA Civ 499; [2001] NPC 71; [2001] 16 EGCS 144; [2002] HLR 30, considered.
(10) Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593; [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032; [1993] 1 All E.R. 42; [1992] STC 898; [1993] I.C.R. 291, considered.
(11) R. (Spath Holme Ltd.) v. Environment Secy., [2001] 2 A.C. 349; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 15; [2001] 1 All E.R. 195; (2000), 33 H.L.R. 31, considered.
(12) Spectrum Plus Ltd., In re, [2004] EWHC 9 (Ch); [2004] 2 W.L.R. 783; [2004] 1 All E.R. 981; [2004] BCC 51; [2004] 1 BCLC 335, considered.
(13) Sussex PeerageCase(1844), 11 Cl. & Fin. 85; 8 E.R. 1034, considered.
(14) Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] Q.B. 151; [2002] 3 W.L.R. 247, considered.
(15) West Ham Churchwardens v. Fourth City Mutual Bldg. Socy., [1892] 1 Q.B. 654; (1892), 61 L.J.M.C. 128; 66 L.T. 350, considered.
(16) Williams v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] A.C. 1189; [2014] 2 W.L.R. 355; [2014] 2 All E.R. 489; [2014] WTLR 873, considered.
(17) Woods v. Thompson, 2016 (2) CILR 1, considered.
The plaintiff sought damages for personal injury.
On January 6th, 2011, the plaintiff was struck and injured by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant. The defendant was prosecuted for dangerous driving. The plaintiff chose to await the outcome of those proceedings before commencing an action for damages. The proceedings did not conclude before the end of the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims (under s.13 of the Limitation Act (1996 Revision)), which ended on January 6th, 2014. It was agreed that if the plaintiff's claim was filed on or before February 7th, 2014, the defendant would not raise a limitation defence. The writ was not issued until February 20th and the defendant claimed the matter was statute barred. The plaintiff applied for the three-year limitation period in s.13 to be disapplied pursuant to s.39 of the Limitation Act and the time for bringing the claim extended.
The defendant claimed that the action was statute barred by s.17 of the Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (2012 Revision), which prescribed a non-extendable limitation period of three years from the date on which a cause of action accrued for injury or damage against or in respect of which a vehicle was required to be insured under the Act. The defendant issued a summons seeking (a) an order pursuant to GCR O.18, r.1(a), (c) and/or (d), striking out the writ of summons and statement of claim on the grounds that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous or vexatious, and/or was an abuse of the process of the court, being statute barred by s.17; alternatively (b) an order pursuant to GCR O.14, r.12 dismissing the plaintiff's claim and entering judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's claim had no prospect of success; alternatively (c) a determination as a point of law under GCR O.14A that the plaintiff's claim was statute barred by s.17.
The issue for the court was whether s.17 of the Vehicle Insurance Act was the existing and operable law, so that the plaintiff's claim was statute barred when it was filed, or whether s.17 had been impliedly repealed by s.13 of the Limitation Act, as had been decided in Bennett v. Diaz(2020 (1) CILR 382), which would permit the court to extend the limitation period. (The decision in Bennett v. Diaz was contrary to the prevailing view that the Limitation Act did not apply to injury to persons arising out of motor vehicle accidents.)
The plaintiff relied on the judgment in Bennett v. Diaz as correctly stating the law. The defendant submitted that that judge had erred in ruling that s.17 had been impliedly repealed by s.13. It was submitted that the judge in Bennett v. Diaz erred in that he (a) failed to give the words of the statutory provisions their plain and obvious meaning; (b) ruled that s.17 was impliedly repealed in the circumstances where the presumptions against repeal were not displaced; (c) resorted to Hansard to resolve an ambiguity which did not exist; and (d) arrived at his decision per incuriam, as s.17, which the judge held had been implied repealed in 1991, was amended by the legislature in 2011.
Estates Proceedings Act 1974, s.5: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 67.
s.13(5): The relevant terms of this subsection are set out at para. 68.
Law Revision Act (2020 Revision), s.3: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 104.
Limitation Act (1996 Revision), s.13: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 18.
s.39: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 19.
s.44: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 20.
Torts (Reform) Act (1996 Revision), s.4: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 69.
Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (2012 Revision), s.17: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 17.
Limitation Act 1623 (Imperial Statute 21 Jac 1, c 16, “An Act for Limitation of Actions and for Avoiding of Suits in Law”): The relevant terms of this Act are set out at para. 30.
L. Hatfield for the plaintiff;
I. Jacob and P. Keeble for the defendant.
1 Ramsay-Hale, J.:
On January 6th, 2011, the plaintiff, Ms. Annette Andrade, was struck and injured by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant, Ms. Patrice Frederick. Ms. Frederick was subsequently prosecuted for dangerous driving. Ms. Andrade elected to await the outcome of those proceedings before commencing an action for damages for the injuries she sustained. The traffic matter, however, did not conclude before the end of the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims which ended on January 6th, 2014. Mr. Tonner, who was then acting for Ms. Frederick in the traffic matter, agreed with Mr. Allen who then represented Ms. Andrade, that if the matter were filed on or before February 7th, 2014, the defendant would not raise a limitation defence.
2 Mr. Allen, however, failed to issue the writ until February 20th, 2014, and Ms. Frederick pleaded that the matter was statute barred as being commenced outside the three-year limitation period prescribed by s.13 of the Limitation Act (1996 Revision) (hereinafter “s.13”).
3 Ms. Andrade applied by originating summons dated December 9th, 2014 for the primary limitation period of three years in s.13 to be disapplied pursuant to s.39 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter “s.39”) and the time for bringing the claim extended. Ms. Frederick subsequently amended her defence to plead that the action was statute barred by s.17 of the Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (2012 Revision) (hereinafter “s.17”) which prescribes a non-extendable limitation period of three...
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