Rodriquez v Ebanks and Ebanks
| Jurisdiction | Cayman Islands |
| Judge | (Smellie, C.J.) |
| Judgment Date | 10 December 2014 |
| Court | Grand Court (Cayman Islands) |
| Date | 10 December 2014 |
(Smellie, C.J.)
Ms. K. McClymont for the petitioner;
A. Akiwumi for the intervener.
(1) Barclays Bank Plc v. Boulter, [1998] 1 W.L.R. 1; [1997] 2 All E.R. 1002; [1997] 2 FLR 157; [1997] 3 F.C.R. 252; on appeal, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1919; [1999] 4 All E.R. 513; [2000] Lloyd”s Rep. Bank. 29; [2000] C.P. Rep. 16; [1999] 2 FLR 986; [1999] 3 F.C.R. 529, referred to.
(2) CIBC Cayman Ltd. v Christiansen, 2008 CILR 103, referred to.
(3) Diplock, In re, Ministry of Health v. Simpson, [1948] Ch. 465, [1948] 2 All E.R. 318; on appeal, [1951] A.C. 521; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1137, referred to.
(4) Eves v. Eves, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338; [1975] 3 All E.R. 768, referred to.
(5) Gissing v. Gissing, [1971] A.C. 886; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 255; [1970] 2 All E.R. 780; (1970), 21 P. & C.R. 702, applied.
(6) Grant v. Edwards, [1986] Ch. 638; [1986] 3 W.L.R. 114; [1986] 2 All E.R. 426; [1987] 1 FLR 87, referred to.
(7) Independent Trustee Servs. Ltd. v. GP Noble Trustees Ltd., [2013] Ch. 91; [2012] 3 W.L.R. 597; [2012] 3 All E.R. 210; [2012] 3 F.C.R. 1; [2012] W.T.L.R. 1171; [2012] EWCA Civ 195, applied.
(8) Lloyds Bank Plc v. Rosset, [1991] 1 A.C. 107; [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867; [1990] 1 All E.R. 1111; [1990] 2 FLR 155; (1990), 60 P. & C.R. 311, followed.
(9) Morris v. Morris, [2008] EWCA Civ 257, distinguished.
(10) New England Mortgage Inv. Ltd. v. Westview Ltd., Grand Ct., October 3rd, 2014, unreported, referred to.
(11) Oxley v. Hiscock, [2005] Fam. 211; [2004] 3 W.L.R. 715; [2004] 3 All E.R. 703; [2004] 2 FLR 669; [2004] 2 F.C.R. 295; [2004] W.T.L.R. 709, [2004] EWCA Civ 546, referred to.
(12) Pettitt v. Pettitt, [1970] A.C. 777; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966; [1969] 2 All E.R. 385; (1969), 20 P. & C.R. 991, referred to.
(13) Rowe v. Prance, [1999] 2 FLR 787; [2000] W.T.L.R. 249, referred to.
(14) Sainz-Ebanks v. Ebanks, Grand Ct., September 4th, 2014, unreported, referred to.
(15) Stack v. Dowden, [2007] 2 A.C. 432; [2007] 2 W.L.R. 831; [2007] 2 All E.R. 929; [2007] 1 FLR 1858; [2007] 2 F.C.R. 280; [2007] BPIR 913; [2008] 2 P. & C.R. 4; [2007] W.T.L.R. 1053; [2007] UKHL 17, applied.
(16) Taylor v. BlakelockELR(1886), 32 Ch. D. 560; 56 L.J. Ch. 390; 55 L.T. 8, referred to.
(17) Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC, [1996] A.C. 669; [1996] 2 W.L.R. 802; [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, considered.
Registered Land Law (2004 Revision), s.23: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 95.
Trusts-constructive trusts-common intention-trust arises when parties intended to share beneficial interest and trustee acts in way that inequitable to deny beneficiary”s interest-court to ask (a) whether parties intended beneficial interest held differently from legal interest; (b) if so, in what way; and (c) whether beneficiary acted to his detriment in reliance of common intention-principles governing constructive trust same whether property registered in both parties” or sole party”s name, but court to take party registered on title into account when determining what parties must have intended
Trusts-constructive trusts-common intention-may be shown through express agreement or inference that party intended what other party would reasonably understand to be his intention based on his words or conduct-when relying on trustee”s conduct, beneficiary to show that acted to his detriment in reasonable belief that was acquiring beneficial interest in property-direct contribution to purchase price unnecessary if has contributed by reference to entire dealings in property
Trusts-constructive trusts-common intention-where no clear evidence of agreement as to size of beneficial interest, court to examine what each party would reasonably understand to be agreement as determined by other party”s actions and words-court not to award shares merely based on levels of contribution or because considers particular arrangement fairer-not possible for parties to intend that interest vary depending on future circumstances
The petitioner petitioned for divorce from her husband and alleged in the associated financial provision proceedings that she had an equitable interest in family property now held by her sister-in-law, the intervener.
During their marriage, the petitioner and her husband purchased a property which they intended to develop into the family home. The property was purchased with a $15,000 down-payment and a mortgage loan. The loan was taken out in the name of the husband and his mother and, further, the property was registered solely in their names. The land was subsequently divided into two parcels, one of which was transferred into the mother”s name out of ‘natural love and affection’ and was turned
into the family home. The other parcel was sold and, shortly after the sale, the mortgage on the property was paid off. After his mother died, the husband”s sisters (the intervener and one other) were granted letters of administration. In their application for letters of administration, the sisters declared that their mother”s estate was worth $200,000 (although the mother”s house alone was sold for $410,000, and, when including the value of the property, the estate was actually worth approximately $750,000) and transferred ownership of the property to the intervener.
The petitioner petitioned for divorce and claimed that she had a beneficial interest in the property. The intervener subsequently applied to be joined to the procedings.
The petitioner alleged that she and her husband had intended that she have an equal share in the property. They had always referred to the house as the family home (and on that basis had applied for funds to assist in the repair of the property after Hurricane Ivan). Further, the $15,000 down-payment had been paid from her and her husband”s combined savings. Although she had known that the mortgage was taken out in the husband”s and his mother”s name, she had been initially unaware the property had been registered in their names and, when she discovered this, her husband had told her that the bank had insisted that his mother be placed on the title as co-borrower; that there was no need to add her name to the title; and that, in any case, they could not afford to do so. She also alleged that she had been unaware that the property had been transferred solely into the mother”s name until the sale of the land. The petitioner additionally claimed that she had frequently contributed to the family income with her salary from various jobs, had worked without pay in the family business to assist the family”s financial situation and had performed extensive work on the property to assist in clearing it and the building of the house. Moreover, there was no evidence that the mother had ever contributed any money to the purchase price of the house or made any contributions to the mortgage and that, together with the husband and the intervener, she had deliberately acted so as to defeat the petitioner”s interest in the property.
The husband, however, alleged that the petitioner had been aware of his mother”s inclusion in the mortgage loan and on the title to the land; that the $15,000 had been provided by his mother (although he also claimed that he contributed his own money and admitted that the savings referred to by the petitioner had existed); and that his mother had continually contributed to the mortgage payments. Although he had had a source of income, this had largely been used to pay for business expenses, the family”s general outgoings and the petitioner”s trip to Costa Rica with their children-although he made no account for the income from the sale of the land. By contrast, the petitioner had never contributed to the mortgage payments, had not worked in the family business nor substantially contributed to the family income. He further claimed that the property had been transferred into his mother”s sole name because he owed her a lot of money and because he was failing to meet certain loan repayments secured against his business”s property and was concerned
that the house would be claimed by the bank-although there was no evidence of any loan so secured. Moreover, the husband claimed that he had offered to put the petitioner”s name on the title, but she had explicitly stated that she did not want an interest in the property because she intended to return to live near to her parents. The husband did admit, though, that the home was purchased to be the family home.
The intervener alleged that she was unaware of any evidence to support the petitioner”s story and that the property had been transferred to her because of the work that she had done to care for her mother in the last days of her life.
The husband died shortly before the proceedings were completed, but the Grand Court (Smellie, C.J., in proceedings reported at 2014 (1) CILR 264) found that the action for the property survived as a lis between the petitioner and the intervener.
The petitioner submitted that the property was held on trust for her. Although the property had been not been registered in her name, both she and her husband had contributed to the purchase price of the property, had contributed to the financial upkeep and running of the house, and had explicitly agreed that they would own it equally. The court should therefore find that there was an agreement, arrangement or understanding between the parties that the beneficial interest in the property be shared equally. Although the interest was never set out in writing, it took the form of a constructive trust and the Registered Land Law (2004 Revision), s.23 stated that the registration of any person as proprietor with absolute legal title did not relieve him or her from any duty to which he or she was subject as trustee. Further, both the husband”s mother and the intervener took the property on notice of her beneficial interest and...
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