Re Campuzano

• Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands
• Judgment Date: 14 June 1983
• Date: 14 June 1983
• Court: Grand Court (Cayman Islands)

IN THE MATTER OF CAMPUZANO

(Summerfield, C.J.)

Grand Court

Extradition-detention pending extradition-period of detention-by Extradition Act 1870, s.8(2), period of detention to be ‘reasonable’ according to circumstances of extradition request but by United States of America (Extradition) Order 1976, incorporating UK/US treaty, not longer than 45 days-US authorities not automatically entitled to that period

Statutes-interpretation-reference to treaties-international treaty not normally of aid in interpreting statute but to be considered when expressly incorporated into domestic legislation-terms of treaty may then limit but not extend legislation

Extradition-detention pending extradition-period of detention-application for habeas corpus not appropriate means of questioning period of detention pending extradition request-certiorari only appropriate if extradition proceedings in excess of jurisdiction, or committal order made on insufficient evidence or for wrong reasons

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) The general rule that a treaty had no effect on a domestic enactr ment did not apply in this case since, by s.2 of the Extradition Act 1870, the Order in Council made to apply the Act to a particular country was required to embody or recite the terms of the arrangement or treaty. The United States of America (Extradition) Order 1976, s.3 stated that the Extradition Act should apply ‘in accordance with’ the treaty of 1972 which, by art. VIII(2), restricted the period of detention to a maximum of 45 days from the date of arrest. It was therefore not only permissible but obligatory for the court to have regard to the treaty, though its terms could only limit and not extend the provisions of the statute (page 371, lines 13–22).

(2) The Summary Court was wrong to observe that the US authorities were entitled to claim that the prisoner could be held for a 45-day period whatever the circumstances. He could only be detained for this period if it were reasonable in the circumstances. It was apparent from the court”s earlier decision, however, that it appreciated that it was not obliged to require detention for the full 45 days and, in the absence of a reasoned judgment, there was nothing to suggest that the prime duty, i.e. to fix a reasonable period, had been ignored (page 371, line 22 – page 372, line 3).

(3) In any event, an application for a writ of habeas corpus was an inappropriate means by which to challenge the decision. Similarly, certiorari would only lie if the lower court had exceeded its jurisdiction, or in the case of a committal order under the Extradition Act 1870, if there were insufficient evidence upon which the order could have been made, or if the wrong test had been applied in coming to the decision. Since none of these factors was present in this case, and in the absence of any suggestion that the period fixed was unreasonable in the circumstances, the application would be dismissed (page 372, lines 3–41).

Cases cited:

(1) Counhaye, In reELR(1873), L.R. 8 Q.B. 410, applied.

(2) Germany (Fed. Rep.) (Government) v. Sotiriadis, [1975] A.C. 1; [1974] 1 All E.R. 692, applied.

(3) R. v. Morn Hill Camp (Commanding Officer), ex p. Ferguson, ELR[1917] 1 K.B. 176, applied.

(4) R. v. Director of Prisons, ex p. MorallyUNK(1975), 24 W.I.R. 355, considered.

Legislation construed:

Extradition Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict., c.52), s.2: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 370, lines 4–16.

s.8(2): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 365, lines 35–41.

United States of America (Extradition) Order 1976 (s.1. 1976/2144), s.3: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 371, lines 9–12.

J. Ramsay, Q.C. for the applicant;

The applicant applied for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from detention pending extradition ordered pursuant to s.8(2) of the Extradition Act 1870.

The applicant was arrested for drug-related offences allegedly committed in the Cayman Islands. While he was in custody, the US Justice Department obtained a warrant for his detention pursuant to s.8(2) of the Extradition Act 1870 on the basis of similar offences allegedly committed in Florida. The local charges were then dropped but the applicant was immediately re-arrested under the authority of the warrant.

The Summary Court (Douglas, Magistrate) allowed 14 days as a ‘reasonable time’ within which to receive the Secretary of State”s order signifying that a requisition had been made for the extradition of the applicant pursuant to s.8. That period was extended twice by the Summary Court (Allen, Ag. Magistrate), on the second occasion to a date 45 days after the execution of the warrant, on the grounds that the US authorities were still actively pursuing the case and were entitled to rely on this period according to art. VIII(2) of the treaty of 1972 between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The applicant sought his release on the grounds that (a) the court had acted ultra vires by referring to the treaty when fixing the period of detention, since the legislation could not be affected by the terms of a treaty; and (b) even if recourse to the treaty were permissible, the court had been wrong to assume that the US authorities were entitled to seek the applicant”s detention for the maximum period prescribed.

The Crown (a) denied that the court had exceeded its authority, as the treaty had been incorporated in the Order in Council applying the Extradition Act 1870 to extradition requests from the United States, and reference to it was therefore permissible; and submitted (b) that an application for a writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate means by which to challenge a decision as to the duration of the period of detention.

R.W. Ground, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.

SUMMERFIELD, C.J.: This is an application for a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to secure the liberty of the appli-
cant who was apprehended by warrant and held in custody, pur-
portedly under s.8 of the Extradition Act 1870, pursuant to the
15	United States of America (Extradition) Order 1976.
The applicant came to these Islands on February 15th, 1983
and was arrested on March 23rd, 1983 on controlled drug-related
offences alleged to have been committed in the Islands. On April
6th, 1983 he was granted bail on terms which he was unable to
20	meet and remained in custody. On April 8th, 1983 the US Justice
Department, through the Legal Department of the Cayman
Islands, obtained a warrant under s.8(2) of the Extradition Act.
The basis for the issue of the warrant was that the appellant was
accused of controlled drug-related offences (being extraditable
25	offences) in the State of Florida in the United States of America.
The regularity of the issue of that warrant is not challenged in any
way.
On May 4th, 1983 the controlled drug-related charges in rela-
tion to this jurisdiction were dropped. The applicant was there-
30	upon arrested under the warrant of April 8th, 1983 and detained.
The following day, May 5th, he was brought before the learned
magistrate, Mr. Kipling Douglas, for remand and to fix a time
pursuant to the last paragraph of s.8 of the Extradition Act which
reads:
35	‘A fugitive criminal apprehended on a warrant issued
without the order of a Secretary of State shall be discharged
by the police magistrate, unless the police magistrate, within
such reasonable time as, with reference to the circumstances
of the case, he may fix, receives from a Secretary of State an

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