Mattison v R

• Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands
• Judge: (Smith, Ag. J.)
• Judgment Date: 22 October 2010
• Court: Grand Court (Cayman Islands)
• Date: 22 October 2010

Grand Court, Criminal Division

(Smith, Ag. J.)

MATTISON

and

R.

N. Dixey for the appellant;

Ms. T. Hutchinson, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.

Cases cited:

(1) Att. Gen. v. Perez, 2010 (1) CILR 188, referred to.

(2) B v. B, [1935] P. 80; [1935] All E.R. Rep. 428, dictum of Merriman, P. applied.

(3) Barrow v. State, [1998] A.C. 846; [1998] 2 W.L.R. 957; (1998), 52 W.I.R. 493, applied.

(4) R. v. Aziz, [1996] A.C. 41; [1995] 3 W.L.R. 53; [1995] 3 All E.R. 149, applied.

(5) R. v. BerradaUNK(1989), 91 Cr. App. R. 131, referred to.

(6) R. v. CameronUNK(1989), 26 J.L.R. 453, dicta of Wright J.A. applied.

(7) R. v. Vye, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 471; [1993] 3 All E.R. 241, dicta of Lord Taylor, C.J. applied.

(8) Singh v. State, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 146; [2005] 4 All E.R. 781; [2006] 2 LRC 409; (2005), 68 W.I.R. 424; [2005] UKPC 35, considered.

(9) Teeluck v. State, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2421; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 378; [2005] 4 LRC 259; [2005] UKPC 14, applied.

Legislation construed:

Criminal Procedure Code (2006 Revision), s.181:

‘The court may adjourn the hearing of the appeal, and may, upon the hearing thereof confirm, reverse, vary or modify the decision of the Summary Court, including the passing of some other sentence (whether more or less severe) or remit the matter to the Summary Court for retrial, or may make such other order in the matter as it may think just, and may, by such order, exercise any power which the Summary Court might have exercised, and such order shall have the same effect and may be enforced in the same manner as if it had been made by the Summary Court:

Provided that the court may, notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the court considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.’

Police Law (2006 Revision), s.66(b):

‘Whoever assaults, obstructs or resists any police officer acting in the execution of his duty or any person acting in aid of such officer is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of one thousand dollars and to imprisonment for two years.’

Evidence-character-previous good character-on trial by judge alone or magistrate, judgment to demonstrate that considered relevance of accused”s good character to both credibility as witness and propensity to offend-failure to state relevance of character to credibility and propensity may render conviction unsafe

The appellant was charged in the Summary Court with assaulting a police officer contrary to s.66(b) of the Police Law (2006 Revision).

The appellant and her partner attended the trial of someone charged with a driving offence in relation to a collision in which the partner had been seriously injured. The accused was acquitted, and the partner became upset and left the courtroom. The appellant hurried after him calling his name, and was followed by a police officer. Upon leaving the courtroom, the appellant swung the door shut behind her. The door struck the police officer on the left shoulder.

The appellant was tried in the Summary Court on a charge of assaulting a police officer contrary to s.66(b) of the Police Law (2006 Revision). The appellant”s defence was that she had not intended to push the door onto the officer, and that the police officer”s injuries were therefore the result of an accident. She adduced evidence to the effect that she was of good character and had no previous convictions. The magistrate nonetheless convicted her, mentioning in her judgment that (a) she had directed her mind to the appellant”s good character and the resulting presumptions arising in her favour; and (b) she did not accept the appellant”s testimony, having found her not to be a credible witness.

The appellant appealed against her conviction on the basis that the magistrate had erred in law, submitting that (a) her previous good character was relevant to both her credibility as a witness and her propensity to commit a criminal offence; (b) the magistrate had failed to direct herself properly in relation to the relevance of her good character to her credibility and propensity, and had therefore failed to apply the correct principles in reaching her decision; and (c) had the magistrate applied the correct principles, it was not inevitable that she would have been convicted since her good character was an essential element of her defence of accident.

The Crown submitted in reply that (a) since this was a summary trial, the magistrate”s statement that she had directed her mind to the appellant”s

previous good character was sufficient to indicate that she was aware of the relevant law and the need to give the good character evidence due consideration; (b) although the magistrate”s judgment did not specifically mention credibility and propensity, the correct principles had nonetheless still been applied; and (c) should the court find that the correct principles had not been applied, it should nonetheless apply the proviso to s.181 of the Criminal Procedure Code (2006 Revision) and dismiss the appeal since, even if the correct principles had been applied, the magistrate would inevitably have reached the same verdict.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) The magistrate had erred in law in failing to apply the correct principles regarding the appellant”s previous good character. On a trial by judge alone or a magistrate, in which the accused is of good character, the judgment would need to demonstrate that the judge considered the relevance of the accused”s good character to both (a) his or her credibility, in that a person of good character would be more likely to be truthful; and (b) his or her propensity to commit a criminal offence. It would be in the interest of justice for the judge to demonstrate clearly that he or she had regard to the correct principles of law-particularly so when the issue was specifically raised by the accused-since this would make an error of omission less likely, and would allow the accused to know whether the correct principles had been applied. If a judge were sitting with a jury, he or she should as a matter of course direct the jury that the accused”s good character was relevant to both credibility and propensity; failure to give such a direction might render any conviction unsafe. In this case, the magistrate”s statement that she had directed her mind to the appellant”s good character and the resulting presumptions arising in her favour was not adequate, in that it failed to indicate that she had put her mind to the relevance of character to credibility and propensity. This would not have been fatal if the remainder of the judgment demonstrated that she had nonetheless applied the correct principles. However, it did not do so-rather, it referred to the accused”s...