Lloyds Bank Intl (Cayman) Ltd v Byleven Corporation SA

• Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands
• Judge: (Schofield, J.)
• Judgment Date: 11 December 1995
• Court: Grand Court (Cayman Islands)
• Date: 11 December 1995

Grand Court

(Schofield, J.)

LLOYDS BANK INTERNATIONAL (CAYMAN) LIMITED

and

BYLEVEN CORPORATION S.A.

LLOYDS BANK INTERNATIONAL (CAYMAN) LIMITED

and

UNYLEVEN CORPORATION S.A.

E.J. Bergstrom for the plaintiff;

A.J.E. Foster for the defendants;

C.G. Quin for the Fernandez family;

Mrs. J. Banks for the Attorney General.

Cases cited:

(1) -Hadmor Prods. Ltd. v. Hamilton, [1983] 1 A.C. 191; [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042, dicta of Lord Diplock considered.

(2) -Iran Nabuvat, The, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1115; [1990] 3 All E.R. 9.

(3) -Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh, [1971] 2 Q.B. 597; [1971] 2 All E.R. 865, followed.

(4) -Universal & Surety Co. Ltd., In re, 1992–93 CILR 157, applied.

(5) -White v. Brunton, [1984] Q.B. 570; [1984] 2 All E.R. 606, followed.

Legislation construed:

Court of Appeal Law (Law 9 of 1975), s.4(f): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out at page 30, line 44 – page 31, line 3.

Trusts-powers and duties of trustees-application for directions-order made on Beddoe application interlocutory and leave required to appeal against it-leave to appeal granted against Beddoe order indemnifying trust protector, since order unprecedented and raises important legal issues

The applicants sought leave to appeal against the granting of a Beddoe order.

The plaintiff trustee obtained a Beddoe order from the Grand Court authorizing it to co-operate with the defendant trust protectors to defend proceedings being brought in New York against the trusts by the applicants and indemnifying the trustee and trust protectors from the trust funds in dispute, in respect of the legal costs of defending those proceedings. The proceedings in the Grand Court are reported at 1994–95 CILR 519. The applicants sought leave to appeal if leave were necessary.

They submitted that (a) leave to appeal against a Beddoe order was not in fact required because it was not an ‘interlocutory judgment’ within the meaning of the Court of Appeal Law, s.4; and (b) if leave were required, it should be granted because the decision to indemnify the trust protectors raised important legal questions which should be considered by the Court of Appeal.

The trustee and the trust protectors submitted that (a) leave to appeal was required because a Beddoe application did not finally determine matters in litigation and it was therefore an ‘interlocutory judgment’ within the meaning of the Court of Appeal Law, s.4; and (b) leave should not be granted because, since the judge had exercised a discretion and not misunderstood the law, there was no basis for the Court of Appeal to interfere.

Held, ruling that leave to appeal was required and granting leave:

(1) Whether a judgment was final or interlocutory for the purpose of the Court of Appeal Law, s.4 depended on the nature of the application rather than the nature of the order made. An order made on a Beddoe application was interlocutory because such an application was essentially one for directions and the order usually stated that further directions

could be sought. It followed that leave was required to appeal against it. Further, s.18(2) of the Grand Court Law stated that in the...