Doak v Doak

• Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands
• Judge: (Zacca, P., Rowe and Taylor, JJ.A.)
• Judgment Date: 12 April 2002
• Court: Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
• Date: 12 April 2002

Court of Appeal

(Zacca, P., Rowe and Taylor, JJ.A.)

DOAK

and

DOAK and RIDLEY

Ms. K. Davidson and C.G. Quin for the appellant;

H.D. Murray and Ms. K. Martinez-Thompson for the respondent.

Cases cited:

(1) Barrett v. Barrett, 2001 CILR 56, referred to.

(2) Uzzell v. Uzzell, 2001 CILR N[12], referred to.

(3) White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596; [2001] 1 All E.R. 1, applied.

Legislation construed:

Matrimonial Causes Law (1997 Revision) (Law 9 of 1976, revised 1997), s.19: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 17.

s.22: The relevant terms of this section are set out at para. 17.

Family Law-financial provision-equality-court”s provisional view of appropriate division to be checked against principle of equal division-principle to be departed from only for good reason-departure not justified by (i) husband”s generous expenditure in maintaining children and home between separation and divorce, or (ii) aim of placing parties in relative financial circumstances similar to those before marriage

The appellant applied for ancillary relief in divorce proceedings.

The parties were married for 20 years and had two children, at the time of their divorce in 1999, aged 14 and 17. The respondent ran a successful architectural practice and the appellant worked as a midwife and cared for the home and the children of the marriage. The parties separated two years before their divorce and the appellant then occupied the family home with the children. From that time onward the respondent continued to pay the mortgage on the home and contributed significantly to the maintenance and educational expenses of the children. His assets, including the matrimonial home registered in his name (with a remaining equity of CI$215,000), were valued at CI$422,000, whilst the wife had debts of CI$3,000. His annual income was approximately 2½ times that of the appellant and he had a pension plan, whilst the appellant did not.

The Grand Court (Murphy, J.) declined to apply a strict mathematical formula in calculating the parties” financial entitlements, on the bases that (i) his order would comprise a substantial maintenance component, the duration of which would depend on whether the children of the marriage continued in full time education until the age of 21, and (ii) the respondent had, since the separation, spent close to half his annual income on maintaining the former marital home and his two children.

Taking into account the appellant”s age, the needs of the child still at school, the parties” lifestyle and the length of the marriage, the court ordered (a) that the respondent continue to pay the younger child”s reasonable educational expenses, together with maintenance, until the age of 17, or 21 if still in formal education and one-half of her medical, dental or optical expenses; (b) that he pay the older child”s reasonable educational expenses until the age of 21; and (c) that the matrimonial home be sold once the younger child had completed her secondary education, and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. Until

then the respondent would pay the mortgage and home insurance. He would also keep up a life insurance policy in the appellant”s name. The court stated that it would be wrong to award either party a sum that would place him or her in a better position than prior to the marriage.

The effect of the order was to give the respondent 75% of the assets and the appellant 25%. The appellant appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) In making an award for financial provision under s.22 of the Matrimonial Causes Law (1997 Revision), the court had to consider the matters listed in s.19, including ‘the responsibilities, needs, financial and other resources, actual and potential earning power and the deserts of the parties.’ The Grand Court”s discretion under the legislation was even broader than that conferred in England by legislation there. It was established law that the parties” relative contributions to acquiring and retaining the matrimonial assets were to be assessed without bias or discrimination as to the nature of the role played by each, e.g. wage-earner or homemaker. Furthermore, whilst there was no presumption that assets should be divided equally between the parties, the principle of equal division was to be used in all cases as a yardstick once the court had formed a provisional view, to assist in avoiding discrimination, and should be departed from only for good reason (paras. 15–18).

(2) In this case an unequal division of the assets was unfair in view of, inter alia, (i) the fact that the appellant had enabled the respondent to build up his business by devoting her earnings to family needs rather than acquiring assets of her own; (ii) the respondent”s much larger earning capacity; and (iii) the respondent”s significant pension fund. That the respondent had made prompt and generous provision for his family in the interim did not justify the disparity of the award. Nor did the desire to reflect the relative positions of the parties prior to their marriage. In order to apply the principle of equal division, the court would order that title to the matrimonial home be transferred into the appellant”s name. From the proceeds of its sale, she would be able to purchase a home suitable for her needs and pay off her debts. The respondent would continue to bear the mortgage costs for six months until the younger child finished her secondary education. He...