Cupidon v Cruz-martinez
| Jurisdiction | Cayman Islands |
| Judge | Graham, J. |
| Judgment Date | 06 August 1998 |
| Court | Grand Court (Cayman Islands) |
| Date | 06 August 1998 |
Graham, J.
Grand Court
Limitation of action - Tort actions for loss of dependency to be brought within three years of death.
Statute - Repeal — Implied repeal — Provisions of later statute repeal earlier inconsistent legislation unless plain wording to contrary
Maples & Calder for the plaintiff
L.A. Samson & Co. for the defendant
The chronology of this tragic matter is as follows: On July 16th, 1993, the deceased, Dean Knight, a semi-professional squash player, was seriously injured when he was knocked off his bicycle as a result of a collision with a vehicle driven by the defendant. The defendant was later convicted of driving that vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Prima facie, therefore, some, if not all liability for the collision is likely to be established against the defendant if this matter ever comes on for trial. As a result, it is alleged, of the injuries suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide on March 15th, 1995. At the time of his death no proceedings had been instituted by him in respect of his injuries.
On June 13th, 1996, letters of administration intestate were granted to his mother, the plaintiff. On March 4th, 1997, a writ was issued claiming damages. It was a little under two years after his death. The statement of claim endorsed on the writ in its finally amended form claims damages on two statutory bases: (a) under the Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision); and (b) under the Torts (Reform) Law of 1996.
A defence was filed on behalf of the defendant, which in its final form pleaded, inter alia, that each of the two claims was statute barred. In respect of the claim under the Estates Proceedings Law this was stated to be because: (a) there was no action pending in any court in the Cayman Islands on behalf of the deceased at the time of his death arising out of the collision on July 16th, 1993; (b) the cause of the action accrued on July 16th, 1993, which was more than one year before the death of the deceased on March 15th, 1995 and the commencement of the action: see s.5 of the Estates Proceedings Law (1995 Revision). In respect of the proceedings under the Torts (Reform) Law (1996 Revision) this matter was said to be time barred by virtue of s.4 of that Law as the proceedings were commenced after the expiration of one year from the death of the deceased on March 15th, 1995.
On July 20th, 1998 an application was made to the court to strike out the whole of the claim under the Grand Court Rules, 0. 18, r.9 and/or 0.14A and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. This application was heard by me on July 29th, 1998.
The case for striking out
It is submitted to me by Mr. Alberga, Q.C. that I can only consider what appears to be the mutually contradictory nature of aspects of the present legislation by referring to the historical background of the Cayman legislation vis-à-vis the equivalent legislation in England. The respective histories of the Cayman and the English legislation are as follows:
Section 4(1) of the first Fatal Accidents Law to be enacted in the Cayman Islands (Chapter 54 of the 1963 Revised Laws) was in identical terms to s.3 of the English Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. The relevant proviso read as follows: “Provided always, that not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint; and that every action shall be commenced within 12 calendar months after the death of such deceased person.” In 1977 Chapter 54 was consolidated with the Law Reform (Tort-Feasors) Law of 1964 and the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Law of 1964 under the title Law of Torts Reform Law (Revised). Part II of that Law dealt with fatal accidents. Section 4(1) was precisely the same as the proviso to s.4 (1) of the old Chapter 54.
The legislature must be taken to have known about the 1954 amendment to the English legislation under s.3 of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions &c.) Act, in which the period of one year was extended to three years. In the event it did not amend the Cayman Law. In 1996 the Law of Torts Reform Law was again revised and renamed the Torts (Reform) Law but again, although there was an opportunity to do so, no change was made in s.4 (1) and the limitation period continued to read as it did in Chapter 54.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the legislature in the Cayman Islands had a number of opportunities to extend the one-year period to three years but never did so, although it had been done in England in 1954. This was consciously to ignore the trenchant comments of Singleton, L.J. in Finnegan v. Cementation Co. Ltd. in which the one-year limitation period was described ( [1953] 1 All E.R. at 136) as “a blot on the administration of the law.” On the basis of all the foregoing I am invited to strike out the whole of the plaintiff's case. I was to consider s.44 of the Limitation Law (1996 Revision) as read with s.13 of that Law.
The case for the plaintiff
It is the plaintiff's case that the defendant's summons should be dismissed because the limitation periods imposed by the Torts (Reform) Law and the Estates Proceedings Law have been repealed by necessary implication and/or overridden by the Limitation Law (1996 Revision) which was originally enacted in 1991. It is submitted to me that the Limitation Law constituted a comprehensive reform of the law relating to the limitation of actions, which is the only explanation as to why its relevant provisions are plainly inconsistent with the earlier Law. The relevant parts of s.13 of the 1996 Revision read as follows:
“(1) This section applies to any action for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether such duty exists by virtue of a contract, a provision made by or under an instrument of a legislative character, or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to himself or any other person.
…
(4) Except where subsection (5) applies, the period applicable is three years from —
(a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.
(5) If the person injured dies before the expiration of the...
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