Att Gen v Miller

JurisdictionCayman Islands
Judge(Forte, Ag. P., Mottley and Vos, JJ.A.)
Judgment Date25 March 2009
CourtCourt of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
Date25 March 2009
Court of Appeal

(Forte, Ag. P., Mottley and Vos, JJ.A.)

ATTORNEY GENERAL
and
MILLER

Ms. N. Moore, Crown Counsel, for the appellant;

E.P. Renvoize for the respondent.

Cases cited:

(1) D.P.P. v. Varlack, [2009] 4 LRC 392; [2008] UKPC 56, followed.

(2) R. v. Galbraith, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1039; [1981] 2 All E.R. 1060; [1981] Crim. L.R. 648; (1981), 73 Cr. App. R. 124; 125 Sol. Jo. 442, referred to.

(3) Smith (Justis Raham) v. R., [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1644; [2000] 4 LRC 432; [2000] UKPC 6, followed.

Legislation construed:

Court of Appeal Law (2006 Revision), s.28(1): The relevant terms of this sub-section are set out in para. 15.

Courts-Court of Appeal-jurisdiction-no jurisdiction to hear appeal against acceptance of no-case submission-assessment of evidence involves mixed question of fact and law-by Court of Appeal Law, s.28(1) appeal limited to ‘question of law alone’

Criminal Procedure-prosecution case-case to answer-guidelines-not for judge to assess strength of circumstantial evidence but what inferences reasonable jury might draw-submission accepted only when, even if all prosecution evidence accepted and favourable inferences drawn, reasonable jury could not find accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt

The respondent was charged in the Grand Court with burglary.

The case for the prosecution rested entirely on circumstantial evidence and the respondent presented an alibi to the court. She was acquitted, following a direction from the judge, who accepted the submission that she had no case to answer. The judge concluded that it would be dangerous to let the decision go to the jury if the prosecution case was weak and vague and if it would have been reasonable for the jury to find that there was a possibility that someone else had committed the burglary.

On appeal, the Attorney General submitted that the court had wrongly determined that the respondent had no case to answer because it had misinterpreted the relevant test, by preventing a case going to the jury when a possible interpretation of the evidence indicated that the accused was not guilty.

The respondent submitted in reply that, pursuant to s.28(1) of the Court of Appeal Law (2006 Revision), the Attorney General had no right to appeal in these circumstances since this was not a ‘question of law alone.’

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The Attorney General was not entitled to appeal since the ground of appeal did not involve a ‘a question of law alone,’ as required by s.28(1) of the Court of Appeal Law. The appeal would involve the court”s examining the Grand Court”s assessment of the prosecution evidence and this would inevitably involve a mixed question of fact and law. This was prohibited by s.28(1) and the appeal would therefore be dismissed (para. 15; paras. 19–20).

(2) Nevertheless, the approach of the lower court to the no-case submission had been wrong. The correct approach, when such a submission was made in circumstances in which the prosecution case had been based on circumstantial evidence, would be to determine what inferences a reasonable jury properly directed would be entitled to draw on the basis of the evidence, rather than for the judge to assess the strength of the evidence. Moreover, the court should focus on whether, on that evidence, however weak or tenuous the judge considered it to be, the jury could reach a verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There would only be no case to answer where, in light of the prosecution case with all evidence accepted and favourable inferences drawn, a reasonable jury could not find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt (paras. 12–14).

1 MOTTLEY, J.A., delivering the judgment of the court: On July 13th, 2007, Raquel Miller, the respondent, was acquitted on a charge of burglary following a direction to that effect by Levers, J., consequent upon the judge accepting a submission that the respondent did not have a case to answer.

2 Miller had been charged with the offence of burglary, contrary to s.237(1)(b) of the Penal Code (2005 Revision), in that, on April 10th, 2006, having entered the building known as Micro Matrix, Centennial Tower, West Bay as a trespasser, she...

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3 cases
  • The Director of Public Prosecutions Appellant v Devon Anglin Respondent
    • Cayman Islands
    • Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
    • 6 November 2014
    ...on the merits, it should hear argument on the question whether — in the light of its earlier decision in Attorney General v Miller [2009 CILR 162], following the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Justis Raham Smith v The Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1644 (an appeal from Bermu......
  • Director of Public Prosecutions v Anglin
    • Cayman Islands
    • Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
    • 6 November 2014
    ...and Ms. E. Lees, Crown Counsel, for the D.P.P.; J. Ryder, Q.C. and Ms. L. Organ for the respondent. Cases cited: (1) Att. Gen. v. Miller, 2009 CILR 162, considered. (2) R. v. B, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57; (1990), 56 CCC (3d) 181, applied. (3) R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345; (1988), 44 CCC (3d) 1......
  • Att Gen v Perez
    • Cayman Islands
    • Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
    • 15 March 2010
    ...D. Perry, Q.C. and T.N. Ward, Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown; A. Akiwumi for the respondent. Cases cited: (1) Att. Gen. v. Miller, 2009 CILR 162, referred to. (2) Smith (Justis Raham) v. R., [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1644; [2000] 4 LRC 432; [2000] UKPC 6, referred to. Legislation construed: Cour......

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